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Abstract 
 
Does regional decentralization threaten the commitment to regional equality in government 
outcomes? We attempt to shed light on this question by drawing on unique evidence from the 
largest European unitary states to have engaged in countrywide health system decentralization: 
Italy and Spain. We estimate, decompose, and run counterfactual analysis of regional inequality 
in government output (health expenditure per capita) and outcome (health system satisfaction) 
during expansion of health care decentralization in both countries. We find no evidence of 
increase in regional inequalities in outcomes and outputs in the examined period. Inequalities 
are accounted for by differences in health system design. 
JEL-Codes: H700, I180, I300. 
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1. Introduction 
Reforms involving the territorial reorganization of public services have become 
common over the past few decades across most European countries (Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions, 2013). Of all public policy responsibilities, the delivery of 
health care exhibits the most drastic power re-allocation to sub-national governments in 
European unitary states (Costa-Font and Greer, 2012)1. The motivation mostly lies in the 
need for government to be accountable to citizens with heterogeneous needs and 
preferences (Oates, 1972). However, it is possible to identify other motivations alongside 
wider economic objectives such as the improvement in the efficiency of public spending 
(e.g., Weingast, 2009) among other.  
 
The decentralisation of publicly subsidized services such as health care, raises the 
concern that it might exacerbate disparities in public sector activity. However, many do not 
question that uniformly run services might generate important regional disparities too, 
which might be of an even larger magnitude. In the health care sector, regional disparities 
in health care activity may result from differences in the clinical practices of physicians 
working in a specific location as well as intended regulations and organisational structures 
(Skinner and Fisher, 1997). In contrast, as we explain below in section two, decentralised 
health system might incentivised equity formally (equalisation grants), or informally 
(policy transfer and diffusion).  
 
                                                          
1 This movement may be counterproductive if health care delivery has large economies of scale and uniform 
needs and preferences. However, both limited-scale economies and heterogeneity in needs and preferences 
offer scope for welfare improvements from a tighter organization of authority and preferences. 
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In a manner similar to that of federal states, unitary states engaging in health care 
decentralization limit the responsibility of regional governments by setting centrally 
defined framework regulation2. Indeed, regional funding comes only from both state level 
taxes but federal set block transfers, which include equalization grants (to correct for initial 
regional disadvantages), and only partially from transferred taxes (e.g., in both Spain and 
Italy, health care is the main policy responsibility of regional governments and accounts 
for almost half of the total regional budgets). 
Existing literature examining the effect of decentralization on regional inequalities 
is ambiguous. Giannoni and Hitris (2002) find evidence that decentralization has increased 
the diversity of regional expenditure per capita in Italy. In contrast, Zhong (2010) 
concludes that regional decentralization in Canada has reduced inter-provincial inequalities 
while it has increased intra-regional differences in utilization. Similarly, studies examining 
health care activity (Quadrado et al., 2001) and outputs and outcomes (Costa-Font and 
Rico, 2006) find a reduction of regional inequalities following the first wave of regional 
devolution in Spain. Hence, it is an empirical question whether a territorially decentralized 
provision of public services aggravates pre-existing regional inequalities. This is a critical 
question in the territorial design of public services, and is particularly important in unitary 
states where long-lasting disparities are deemed to be defeating the mission of a national 
health service (‘equal service for equal need’). However, limited empirical evidence has 
been gathered on this subject. Most of the evidence is based on single-country analysis, 
and thus, the role played by country-specific institutional settings remains unclear. The 
present paper attempts to contribute to the literature in several ways. 
 
                                                          
2 By ‘federal state’ we refer here to the constitutional definition of the state rather than the actual political and 
fiscal dynamics of the countries under study. Both Italy and Spain share some of the classical features of 
federal states.  
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First, we examine the patterns of regional inequalities in the two largest European 
unitary states that have decentralized the health system throughout their territory, namely 
Italy and Spain. Evidence on the effect of decentralisation on regional equality to date 
refers to one country alone. The advantage of drawing from data from more than one 
country is that it allows for cross-country counterfactual analysis and improves the 
generalizability and the external validity of the results.  
Second, we specifically take advantage of the fact that the original decentralization 
design has been subject to two comparable processes of reform.3 Indeed, both Italy and 
Spain4 are unitary states exhibiting similar institutional designs (e.g., tax-funded health 
care, similar decentralization and number of regional units, framework laws, unitary state 
structures, and funding equalization mechanisms).Our empirical strategy follows a before-
and-after methodology to examine the prevailing longitudinal regional inequality patterns 
in outputs and outcomes in both Italian and Spanish regions from 1998 to 2009. That is, 
five years before and seven years after the second decentralization wave.  
Third, given that government decentralization can influence both the way users 
access health care and several dimensions of quality of care and output, but not necessarily 
health outcomes directly (e.g., mortality), we concentrate on examining the effect on 
outputs ( using unadjusted per capita spending) and a health care process related dimension 
                                                          
3 Both Italy and Spain have gone through two specific waves of decentralization: a first wave around 1980 
(1978 in Italy, and 1981 in Spain), and the second wave two decades later around 2000 (1999 in Italy, and 
2002 in Spain). 
4 In the United Kingdom (at the time of the study), devolution has only affected Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland, while England has remained centrally managed. In contrast, Italy and Spain exhibited a 
countrywide devolution in the second wave examined here.  
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of quality sensitive to health policy reform .5 We control for regional differences in fiscal 
capacity (proxied by income per capita at the regional level) and health care needs 
(measured by the share of people over 65 years of age). Finally, the paper contributes by 
employing a set of outcome and empirical strategies that extends previous research. 
One outstanding question is whether territorial decentralization is actually driving 
patterns of regional inequalities in comparison with other potential drivers. To attempt to 
shed some light to such question, we consider a number of tests on standard inequality 
indices and we perform a regression-based (Oaxaca–Blinder) decomposition analysis to 
understand how much the observed inequality can be explained by decentralization alone. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the 
institutional background of the two examined countries. Section 3 describes the data used 
and the empirical strategy. Section 4 sets out the results, and Section 5 discusses 
conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The effects of such processes can be captured in an overall health system satisfaction evaluation that is 
sensitive to changes in service quality in advanced economies (Blendon et al., 1990; Footman et al., 2013). 
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2.  Background 
2.1. Decentralization and regional inequalities in government activity 
Decentralization (also called devolution) as we refer to here entails the re-allocation of 
central government responsibilities to sub-central institutions; typically, it implies the re-
assignment of regional or local autonomy. The main mechanism through which 
decentralization can influence governance is by strengthening political and fiscal 
accountability. Thus, to study the mechanisms through which decentralization can 
influence regional inequalities in government activity, political and fiscal accountability 
need to be examined together.  
Political accountability, in the form of regional autonomy, is deemed to increase the 
probability of health reforms (Chernichovsky, 1995), government spending, and 
redistribution (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2011). However, such autonomy is usually 
exercised within the limits imposed by framework legislation, naturally limiting potential 
diversity in public service provision in federal states. On the other hand, if regional 
autonomy is reflected in regional-specific needs and preferences, the spatial distribution of 
resources should mirror such preferences, which would increase diversity in outputs.6 
Nonetheless, even without the framework law limits to diversity, diversity can be reduced 
if there are inceptives for policy transfer. Hence, the overall longer term effects on 
inequalities over time are ambiguous (Besley and Kudamatsi, 2006; Kang et al., 2012). 
From a fiscal standpoint, decentralizing funding (e.g., tax base and rate), even if 
only refer to handful of taxes, should alter the balance between political and funding 
                                                          
6 Sen (1999) notes that no famines occur in countries where there are regular elections and a free press. 
Epidemiological research into the social determinants of health indicates that being subordinate to authority 
can have detrimental effects on mental and physical health (Marmot, 2004). 
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responsibility, and hence expand fiscal accountability. This would activate constituents’ 
incentives to ‘vote-with-their-feet’ (Oates, 1972), and to strengthen their control on 
government activity (so-called ‘political agency’). Both, ought to improve governance and 
reduce undesired disparities (Breton, 1996; Weingast, 2009). In contrast, if decentralization 
fails to produce the political incentives to improve public services in some regions, and 
fails to engage people in regional mobility, then one would observe an expansion of 
differences across regions.  
Another explanation for the emergence of spatial differences lies in the effects of 
differences in economic development, which may limit the potential for fiscal 
accountability effects to be fully exercised. Decentralization is likely to benefit regions that 
already have a higher fiscal base from which to extract government resources. This would 
be expected to exacerbate disparities across regional health services. For example, in the 
context of the United States, Skinner and Fisher (1997) argue that a federally (centrally) 
organized Medicare leads to wide disparities in medical spending per capita, which persist 
after adjusting by age, gender, price, and illness-related factors. In other words, an 
increasing efficiency of some states in delivering health care may come at the expense of 
higher disparities in health outcomes.  
One potential limit to an expansion of spatial inequalities is the role of equalization 
grants to correct for differences in initial disposable resources, but this is not without 
controversy. Recently, Kessler et al. (2011) challenged this view by drawing on the logic 
of a policy innovation and diffusion paradigm. They suggest that equalization grants in a 
federation give rise to interregional income inequalities that could not persist otherwise 
because of migration. In addition, they show that, although equalization grants in federal 
countries can actually contribute to equalize resources, equality of resources does not 
necessarily lead to equality of services if the quality of local governments (and their 
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efficiency in providing the services) is heterogeneous across a country. This may be 
defined as the ‘equalization grants paradox’ in interregional transfer payments. Hence, 
whether the latter takes place or not is an empirical question.  
A subtler explanation for the emergence of inequalities across regions is the 
existence of spatial interdependence. If decentralisation brings transparency (Beland and 
Lacours, 2010), then some regional health services are likely to innovate by adopting 
successful policies, but it takes some time, and possibly political incentives, for the 
remaining regions to emulate the frontrunner. If an institutional design allows for some 
competition across jurisdictions, a common standard may be reached informally, which 
would reduce regional differences. This would be reinforced by the presence of laws 
imposing minimum common standards across jurisdictions. Some empirical literature 
challenges this view by considering different cross-country measures of equality and 
different countries (e.g., in terms of income: Costa-Font and Rico, 2006; Costa-Font, 2010; 
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010; Sorens, 2014). 
Finally, a final explanation for the development of regional inequalities in 
government activity may be that decentralization implies a loss of political influence for 
poorer regions in the allocation of federal funds, resulting in fewer resources being 
available at the local level. Whether this is the case or not depends on the political 
dynamics of each country, as well as the population of relatively poorer regions which 
explain some central-level resistance to further decentralization. If certain (poorer) regions 
were already well represented in central-level institutions, then decentralization by 
scattering decision-making power may weaken the leverage of those regions that would as 
a result experience a loss of influence. 
One limitation of the existing literature is that evidence on the spatial effects of 
health care decentralization is mostly limited to single-country analysis and thus has 
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limited external validity. The present paper attempts to overcome this type of limitation by 
extending the analysis to two comparable country experiences of health care 
decentralization, as described in the next section.  
 
2.2. Decentralized unitary states: Italy and Spain 
The institutional default in Italy and Spain is comparable. Both countries are unitary states, 
and thus the authority that the regions hold comes directly from the central state. Italy has 
been a unitary state since 1861, but region states have existed since only 1970. Similarly, 
Spain has been a unitary state, with only two republican periods in 1873 and 1931, during 
which attempts were made to create a federal and regional state, respectively. However, 
unlike in the United Kingdom, devolution in Italy and Spain did not follow a ‘historic 
nation’ approach to create ‘federacies’, and instead was inspired by a ‘system of regions’ 
model whereby all regions were required to be responsible for health care. Perhaps the 
main difference between Italy and Spain is the initial asymmetries of Spanish 
decentralization until 2002 where health care responsibilities were transferred to all 
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autonomous communities.7 The exceptions are Navarra and the Basque Country in Spain,8 
which have special fiscal status, and the special status of some Italian regions. Both 
countries have undertaken a comparable regional decentralization process where autonomy 
is limited by framework legislation. 
In both countries, basic social services such as health care are tax funded with an 
explicit commitment to delivering health system equality in their health care legislation. 
The regional allocation of resources is in both countries based on comparable resource 
allocation formulas, which include equalization grants.9 Funding comes from resources 
collected regionally (either from transferred taxes or participation in state-wide taxes) and 
block transfers from the central government, including equalization grants based generally 
on population and other criteria (including fiscal capacity, meaning that more funds from 
the central government are directed toward poorer communities). General taxes were (and 
                                                          
7 The first wave began with the transfer of health care responsibilities to Catalonia (completed in 1981), 
followed by Andalucia (1984), the Basque Country and Valencia (1988), Galicia and Navarra (1991), and 
ended with the transfer of health care responsibilities to the Canary Islands (1994). A second wave followed 
that bridged the gap between the regions with health care responsibilities, and the 10 remaining regions were 
invested with the same level of health care responsibilities in 2002. 
8 For example, article 117 of the Italian Constitution assigns to the Central State the exclusive right to only 
‘define the Essential Levels of Services linked to civil and social rights to be guaranteed in the whole 
country’. Health care services are of course included, so that only the central government can identify the 
mandatory level of care to be assured in all regions, and it has the exclusive right to define the framework 
legislation. 
9 Navarra and the Basque Country are two special regions with a specific funding system and have managed 
to claim their historical fiscal self-government rights. Unlike the other region states of Spain, they collect 
their taxes and transfer to the central government the estimated costs of centrally provided public services, 
with little contribution to the overall country redistribution. 
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still are) collected by the central state and transferred to the regions using unadjusted block 
grants.  
Both Italy and Spain increased not only the degree of fiscal self-government after 
2001–2002, but the extent of political accountability as well. In Italy, from 1993 to 1997, 
the fiscal decentralization process received a boost with the attribution to regional 
governments of contributions for the National Health Service. However, it was only from 
1998 onwards that a regional tax on productive activities (IRAP) was created together with 
a regional surcharge.  After constitutional reform in 2001, Italy established framework 
legislation to ensure that ‘essential levels of care’ were linked to central government. 
Similarly, in Spain, further fiscal accountability in 1992 introduced regional participation 
in income tax (15%), which by 2002 amounted to 33% of income tax and 40% of value 
added tax, although with a highly restricted capacity to raise the tax base and tax rate. 
These trends are clear from Figure 1 and 2, representing the evolution of the share of 
central government revenue (expenditure, respectively) out of general government revenue 
(expenditure) in both Italy and Spain. Data are taken from the OECD Fiscal 
Decentralization Database and are commonly used indicators in the literature (e.g., Sacchi 
and Salotti, 2016); they clearly show decreasing trends, an evidence supporting the 
consolidation of the decentralization process in both countries. 
Of all the policies that have been devolved, health care is the most comparable 
policy between countries and has the largest impact on the public budget. It represents 
about ¾ of the budget for Italian regions and 1/2 for Spanish ones. Health care is for the 
most part an undisputed regional-state responsibility in both Italy and Spain, and only a 
small number of policy responsibilities are left to the central states (e.g., drug price setting 
and international health).  
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[Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here] 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Rationalizing regional inequalities 
In this section, we examine the main hypothesis of the paper, namely whether government 
territorial decentralization influences regional inequalities and their potential triggers. 
Thus, we examine whether inequality in one dimension is related to inequality in a 
different (but interrelated) domain, based on the premise that resources are allocated (and 
equalized) by the central government, but are eventually spent and managed by regional 
governments. The starting point is to examine whether the equalization of funding – and 
thus of resources available to each regional government via equalization grants and own 
revenues following decentralization – necessarily implies equalization of output, 
considering that health care activity (OUTPUT) results from the use of health care inputs 
(RESOURCES). We can define a simple function for this as follows: 
OUTPUT=f(RESOURCES, Xf)                                            (1) 
where X is a set of controls that may affect how resources are translated into outputs by 
each regional government (we avoid additional subscripts for simplicity purposes). In turn, 
we also attempt to measure a simple relationship for the empirical question of whether 
output equalization implies equalization of outcomes as follows: 
OUTCOMES=g(OUTPUT, Xg)                                           (2) 
This relationship captures the idea that health care activity will produce some 
outcomes in dimensions that can be measured after a reasonable period of time. This is 
referred to below as the quality of services. 
Decentralization enters our empirical specification via resources and constraints for 
each local government: the amount of resources is conditioned by the equalization role 
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played by central government, both before and after decentralization; the composition of 
resources in terms of own revenues versus transfers from the centre is affected both by the 
degree of fiscal decentralization and the availability of the tax base at the local level. 
However, the operationalization of our specified measures is as follows. First, we collected 
data for Italian and Spanish regions over the years 1998–2009 from the Ministry of Health 
and the National Institute of Statistics of both countries. The period examined is, as 
explained in Section 2.2, one during which significant processes of reform took place, 
leading to the consolidation of fiscal decentralization in Italy and Spain (second wave of 
health care decentralization). We have examined subsamples of regions for Spain and Italy, 
but given the potential for interregional mobility, especially between neighbouring 
jurisdiction, and the lower precision when subsamples of small regions are examined, we 
do not to exclude any region from the analysis. This strategy produces conservative 
estimates as it would change inequality estimate upwards in the event of devolution 
increasing regional inequalities.  
 
Alongside a series of records on regional characteristics that may influence either 
outcomes or outputs, we focus on examining two main variables of interest: health care 
spending per capita (HEXP, which we consider as a proxy for outputs, according to 
Atkinson, 2005) and the quality of services (QUAL, the share of people very satisfied with 
medical care, which we take as a proxy for procedural outcomes). The strategy we follow 
here is aimed at measuring the variation in the degree of inequality in these two domains 
before and after the consolidation of decentralization. We draw on a well-established 
empirical strategy based on the use of concentration indices and coefficients of variation to 
measure inequality and an Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition methodology to decompose its 
determinants and run counterfactual estimates. 
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3.2. Evaluating regional inequalities 
To measure regional inequality in both countries, we begin by estimating the Gini 
concentration index. Specifically, we first rank regions according to their per capita GDP 
(a measure of fiscal capacity, and thus of a higher fiscal capacity following the 
consolidation of fiscal decentralization) and compute the Gini concentration index for both 
HEXP and QUAL, pooling all the years before decentralization and after decentralization, 
and then separately for the two sub-periods. We then test whether the Gini index is 
statistically significantly different from zero, to understand whether inequality is present 
and, if it is, to what degree in both domains. Following similar steps, we then compute the 
coefficients of variation for each year on both HEXP and QUAL and test whether average 
coefficients of variation are different before and after decentralization. We also consider 
for this exercise two additional variables as measures for fiscal capacity and needs. 
Finally, we better characterize the observed trends in inequality by considering an Oaxaca–
Blinder decomposition. Let ∆=E(QUALa|X)-E(QUALb|X) be the difference in conditional 
means of the outcome variable QUAL comparing before (b) and after (a) decentralization. 
Thus, ∆=[E(Xa)ꞌβa]-[E(Xb)ꞌβb] can be decomposed as: 
∆=[E(Xa)-E(Xb)]ꞌβb +E(Xb)[βa-βb]+[E(Xa)-E(Xb)][βa-βb]                      (3) 
where the first of the three terms represents the differences in ‘endowments’ (X), namely 
the determinants of QUAL, mainly health care spending; the second term represents the 
differences in the coefficients (β), namely the way in which health spending is transformed 
into outcome before and after decentralization; and the final term represents the 
interactions between the two differences, accounting for the fact that differences in both 
endowments and coefficients exist simultaneously before and after decentralization (e.g., 
Jann, 2008, for more technical details). We test two specifications: the first one includes in 
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X the variable HEXP only; in the second one, we augment this baseline specification with 
the share of people over 65 years of age (OVER65, as a measure of greater health care 
needs), the per capita GDP (GDP, as a measure of fiscal capacity), and a dummy picking 
up the political alignment between regional and central government (ALIGNMENT), 
because this may influence the amount of available resources and spending (see, e.g., for 
the Italian case: Bordignon and Turati, 2009; Piacenza and Turati, 2014). 
As a further exercise, we also consider a counterfactual analysis, exploiting the 
differences in decentralization patterns between the two countries. The basic idea behind 
this exercise is to understand whether the differences in outcomes between Italy and Spain 
are explained by observable characteristics (the ‘endowments’) or by coefficients (which 
maps how observed characteristics are translated into outcomes by regional governments 
in the two countries). Let Φ=E(YSpa)-E(YIta)=[E(XSpa)ꞌβSpa]-[E(XIta)ꞌβIta]; again, this can be 
decomposed as: 
Φ=[E(XSpa)-E(XIta)]ꞌβIta +E(XIta)[βSpa-βIta]+[E(XSpa)-E(XIta)] [βSpa-βIta]             (4) 
where the three terms are defined as before and allow us to attribute the difference in 
outcome to the difference in ‘endowments’ between the two countries (i.e., the observed 
characteristics of Italian and Spanish regions in terms of spending per capita, but also 
political alignment and fiscal capacity); the difference in the way resources are transformed 
into outcomes in the two countries (which will capture the institutional differences in the 
regional health care systems, including the quality of regional governments); and the 
residual interactions between these two terms. As before, we consider the simplest 
specification first, considering only HEXP in X, and then add further controls. 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for all the variables 
considered in the analysis. Average HEXP is approximately 500 euros higher in Italy than 
in Spain, although the difference in per capita income is approximately 3000 euros. The 
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share of people over 65 years of age is also larger in Italy than in Spain by approximately 
2%, as is the share of people very satisfied with received medical care. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Preliminary analysis 
To begin with, we test the correlation between outcomes and outputs by regressing 
measures of (process-related) quality of services on health care spending per capita. A 
positive and significant correlation is found between the two variables: 0.004 for Spain 
(10% significance level) and 0.008 for Italy (1% significance level), indicating that, as 
expected, inequality in outputs may give rise to inequality in process-related outcomes. 
 
4.2. Inequality estimates 
Next, to test for the presence of regional inequalities, we first estimate the Gini 
concentration index, following the methodology described in, for example, O’Donnell et 
al. (2008), by ranking regions according to their per capita GDP. Table 1 shows the Gini 
index for both health system satisfaction (QUAL) and unadjusted output (HEXP) for Spain 
(upper panel) and Italy (lower panel) for all the years, and separately for the sub-period 
1998–2002(2001), which denotes before the ‘second decentralization wave’, and the sub-
period 2003(2002)–2009, which denotes the post-decentralization wave. 
All the Gini coefficients are significantly different from zero except for the 
procedural outcome measure relating to the 1998–2002 period in Spain (the end of the first 
wave of health care decentralization). This exception can be explained by the fact that 
during this period a large number of policy innovations in some regions were extended to 
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the rest of the country (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006). Thus, the results show no evidence of 
inequality in both dimensions. However, the patterns of these inequality indices indicate 
significant persistence across the two sub-periods, but are markedly different in both 
overall dimension estimates across both countries. Specifically, considering the whole 
period, Italian regions are slightly less unequal than Spanish ones in terms of spending. 
These estimates include Italian autonomous regions and all the Spanish regions (i.e., 
Navarra and the Basque Country) that hold higher fiscal accountability than the rest. Given 
that these regions are relatively affluent; they have more resources to invest in health care. 
However, in both countries, after the consolidation of decentralization at the beginning of 
the 2000s, we observe the same level of inequality, which is suggestive of a decline in 
regional inequalities in output after devolution, consistent with the findings of Costa-Font 
and Rico (2006).  
Nonetheless, when we turn to examining inequalities in outcomes, we find 
inequalities in process-related outcomes (health system satisfaction) to be not significantly 
affected by devolution for Italy, while Table 1 reveals some differences across Spanish 
regions only after 2002. Thus, different patterns are observed across the two countries with 
respect to inequality in the two domains (i.e., outputs and outcomes) following the impact 
on resources stemming from decentralization. However, whether these patterns result from 
a decentralization design is a question that we examine further below.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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To better understand the evolution in inequality, we compute coefficients of 
variation for the two countries in each year on the two domains (quality and spending). The 
advantage of the coefficient of variation is that it is a simple way to compare datasets with 
different means and particularly suited to our study. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the 
two coefficients for all the examined years. We formally test whether mean values of 
coefficients of variation are different before/after decentralization with a standard t-test. 
The upper panel of Table 2 shows the results, which confirm the different patterns 
discussed above. As in Spain, inequality in quality decreased (t-test significant at the 10% 
level), despite an increase in inequality in spending (t-test significant at the 1% level) 
experienced in the first years after devolution (in particular in 2007), but it actually 
declined over time. Thus, decentralization decreased inequality in outcomes, despite 
increasing – at least in the short run – differences in spending. In the case of Italy, 
inequality in spending actually decreased after decentralization (t-test significant at the 1% 
level), but inequality in quality did not vary significantly; thus, decentralization reduced 
differences in spending, but not in outcomes. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
We also extend the analysis of the trends in inequality to two additional domains, 
namely fiscal capacity (proxied by per capita GDP) and needs (proxied by the share of 
people over 65 years of age). The lower panel of Table 2 shows these results. After 
decentralization, both countries experienced a decrease in inequality in fiscal capacities (t-
test significant at the 1% level in both countries), which was larger for Spanish regions; 
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thus, convergence has been more rapid for Spanish regions in terms of per capita GDP. In 
contrast, we find two divergent patterns of inequality in needs, which increase in Italy and 
decrease in Spain: Italian regions are becoming more diverse in terms of needs, but this is 
not greatly reflected in the divergence of spending per capita. The opposite occurs for 
Spanish regions. Figure 3 reproduces this evidence and shows similar long-term patterns 
for both the coefficient of variation of health expenditure and health system satisfaction, 
despite year-specific deviation such as in 2005. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
4.3. Inequality decompositions 
However, one potential concern is that patterns of inequality may not necessarily result 
from the expected mechanisms. To further understand the effect of these different 
mechanisms, we take advantage of a standard Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition 
methodology, which allows us to attribute the difference in QUAL to three different 
components: the determinants of the procedural outcome, the way in which these 
determinants map in the outcome before and after decentralization, and the interactions 
between the two differences (e.g., O’Donnell et al., 2008).  
Table 3 shows the estimates relative to the two model specifications discussed in 
Section 3.2 for both countries: column I assumes only HEXP in the set of determinants; 
whereas column II expands the set of controls by adding fiscal capacity (GDP), need 
(OVER65), and ALIGNMENT. Overall, the results are consistent across the two 
specifications: coherently with the earlier findings (Table 2), differences in QUAL are not 
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statistically significant. In contrast, differences in the determinants appear to be statistically 
significant and counterbalanced by differences in the coefficients (which are, however, 
significant only in the less rich specification). Average ‘endowments’ increased after 
decentralization, but coefficients β changed in the opposite direction, at least in the 
simplest specification. Thus, our results are consistent with the idea that the consolidation 
of federalism did appear to influence the way in which spending is actually transformed 
into the procedural outcome. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.4. Counterfactual exercise 
Finally, we run a counterfactual exercise, comparing Italy and Spain and explaining 
differences in outcomes across the two countries, again using an Oaxaca decomposition 
strategy. Table 4 shows the results, where columns I and II again denote the same two 
specifications discussed in Section 4.3. Importantly, these results appear to be consistent 
across specifications: differences in procedural outcomes (statistically significant across 
Italy and Spain) appear to be more explained by differences in the coefficients (namely the 
way in which Spanish and Italian regions transform outputs into outcomes) than by 
differences in the observed determinants of outcomes (from spending to fiscal capacity and 
needs). 
Overall, our results indicate some important differences across the countries in the 
evolution of regional inequalities that can be mainly explained, as expected, by differences 
in the institutional designs of the health systems. In particular, exploiting the different 
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pattern of devolution across the two countries, also these results indicate that government 
decentralization consistently did not increase regional inequality in outputs and outcomes. 
A crucial role is likely to be played by the quality of regional governments, captured here 
by the coefficients’ component of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Of all public services, health care has been the most decentralized across countries and 
thus is the most ideal to compare across countries. Specifically, many large European 
health care systems have progressively been re-allocating part of their political and fiscal 
authority to the regions. However, in unitary states, such reforms may pose some concerns 
insofar as they as perceived to dismantle the principles of equality on which they are based. 
Whether decentralization does expand regional inequalities in public sector activities is an 
empirical question and the main aim of this paper. 
This paper has taken advantage of unique data from the experience of Italy and 
Spain of health care decentralization, to understand the effect of decentralized government 
on outputs and outcomes. Specifically, we have examined whether decentralization has led 
to regional imbalances in either health care activity or outcomes. To do this, we measured 
regional inequalities in outcomes and process-related outcomes and employed a regression-
based decomposition strategy to decompose them. 
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The results provide us with unique evidence to evaluate the performance of regional 
decentralization. Italy and Spain are the two unique European countries to examine insofar 
as they exhibit  comparable health care system designs and have devolved health care 
authority to their respective regions in a comparable fashion in the same period of time . 
Some other contextual factors are also comparable and common, except for historical 
legacies that are country-specific. We find no evidence that expansion of inequalities took 
place after decentralization on both health outcomes and resources available to the regions. 
This finding is consistent with evidence from Spain and Canada (Costa-Font and Rico, 
2006; Costa-Font, 2010; Zhong, 2010). The inequality indices are different from zero, but 
when examining trends in inequalities in outcomes, we find a declining inequality after the 
consolidation and deepening of decentralization processes. Although inequality is found to 
be persistent before and after decentralization, inequality patterns are different across the 
countries. Italian regions are slightly less unequal than Spanish ones in terms of spending 
(even including autonomous regions). However, inequality indices have dropped in both 
countries and are found to be comparably similar (not statistically different in the second 
period examined). In contrast, Italian regions are more unequal in terms of (process) 
outcomes, and decentralization reduced differences in spending, but not in process-related 
outcomes. 
Possible explanations for these limited regional inequalities include the 
development of framework laws and the role of equalization funds that limit the expansion 
of diversity of outputs. However, a more powerful explanation is based on the potential 
effect that decentralization exerts on incentives for policy innovation and diffusion. These 
incentives apply to both Italy and Spain, because some region states play the role of 
frontrunner in devising new programmes that are subsequently adopted in other regions. 
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Thus, organizational advantages of some regions exert positive external effects on other 
regions. 
To conclude, from a policy standpoint, processes of health care decentralization in 
unitary states are unlikely to be a concern for regional cohesion in the context of European 
unitary states so long as the design promotes competition and policy innovation, and 
equalisation mechanisms and framework regulation do not exert unintended effects. The 
challenge lies in how to maintain a balance between incentivizing policy innovation and 
diffusion without hampering spatial cohesion, a challenge which call for a specific 
attention to the quality of governments. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of central government revenue out of total general government 
revenue (1998-2009) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of central government expenditure out of total general government 
expenditure (1998-2009) 
 
 
28 
 
 
Tab. 1. Inequality in resources and outcomes (Gini index) 
Spain  All yrs. 1998-2002 2003-2009 
Quality (‘Health system satisfaction’)  0.034* 0.019  0.062** 
  [0.018] [0.029]  [0.023] 
Output (‘Public spending per capita’)  0.093*** 0.031***  0.026*** 
  [0.009] [0.008]  [0.009] 
Italy  All yrs. 1998-2001 2002-2009 
Quality (‘Health system satisfaction’)  0.147*** 0.146***  0.157*** 
  [0.009] [0.015]  [0.012] 
Output (‘Public spending per capita’)  0.057*** 0.047***  0.028*** 
  [0.006] [0.007]  [0.005] Note: This table reports the Gini index of health systems satisfaction (Quality) and unadjusted output 
(spending per capita) across regions in Spain (upper panel) and Italy (lower panel) for the whole period 
examined 1998-2009 in column one. Columns two and three provide the Gini for the subperiods 1998-
2002(2001) which refer to before as the ‘second decentralization wave’ and the period 2003(2002)-2009 
which refer to post decentralization wave. SE in square brackets. Sig. lev.: *** 1%, **5%, * 10%.  
 
 
Table 2. Trends in inequality 
 
Quality (satisfaction) 
 
Health Spending p.c. 
 
before after Diff 
 
before after diff 
        Spain 0.468 0.456 -0.011* 
 
0.079 0.090 0.011*** 
   
(0.007) 
   
(0.002) 
        Italy 0.339 0.344 0.005 
 
0.086 0.077 -0.009*** 
   
(0.005) 
   
(0.001) 
 
Fiscal capacity 
 
Needs 
 
before after Diff 
 
before after diff 
        Spain 0.214 0.193 -0.021*** 
 
0.180 0.198 -0.018*** 
   
(0.0007) 
   
(0.0008) 
        Italy 0.253 0.248 -0.006*** 
 
0.168 0.134 0.034*** 
   
(0.0006) 
   
(0.001) 
Note: This table reports the means of the coefficient of variation in the period before 
decentralization (1998-2002(2001)) and in the period after (2002(2003)-2009), together with the t-
test for the difference in means. We measure four different variables: health system satisfaction, 
health spending per capita, fiscal capacity proxied by GDP per capita and need proxied by 
population over 65. SE in parentheses. Sig. lev. t-test on diff.: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of coefficient of variation for quality and health spending 
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Table 3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Y: quality) 
Variables Italy Spain 
 
I II I II 
Yb 35.93*** 35.93*** 24.15*** 24.52*** 
 
(1.354) (1.361) (0.998) (1.242) 
Ya 36.66*** 36.23*** 24.40*** 24.40*** 
 
(1.001) (1.183) (1.012) (1.021) 
Difference Yb-Ya -0.726 -0.292 -0.255 0.111 
 
(1.684) (1.804) (1.421) (1.607) 
Endowments -8.227*** -6.532*** -5.544** -5.121** 
 
(2.395) (2.295) (2.460) (2.203) 
Coefficients 13.64*** 3.681 10.83** 3.715 
 
(4.375) (2.934) (4.294) (5.733) 
Interaction -6.136 2.559 -5.541 1.517 
 
(4.718) (3.269) (4.747) (5.927) 
Observations 240 200 238 204 
Note: This table reports an Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the conditional means of quality 
(health system satisfaction) before and after decentralisation. Col. I: controls include only 
spending per capita. Col. II: controls include spending per capita, GDP pc, share people over65, 
alignment. SE in parentheses. Sig. lev.: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Table 4. Comparing Italy and Spain (Y: quality) 
Variables I II 
Yspa 24.28*** 24.45*** 
 
(0.708) (0.781) 
Yita 36.42*** 36.11*** 
 
(0.803) (0.889) 
Difference Yspa-Yita -12.14*** -11.66*** 
 
(1.070) (1.183) 
Endowments -4.114*** -1.333 
 
(1.296) (1.161) 
Coefficients -9.942*** -7.837*** 
 
(1.534) (1.358) 
Interaction 1.915 -2.488* 
 
(1.696) (1.398) 
Observations 478 404 
Note: This table reports an Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the conditional means of 
quality for Italy compared to Spain. Col. I: controls include only spending per capita. Col. 
II: controls include spending per capita, GDP pc, share people over65, alignment. SE in 
parentheses. Sig. lev.: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
Spain 
Health 
Spending pc 238 991.74 313.78 485.50 1883.52 
Quality 238 24.28 10.90 4.80 58.69 
GDP pc 238 18309.81 5275.38 7614.00 31496.00 
SharePop65 204 17.89 3.40 11.04 24.60 
Alignment 204 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
Italy 
Health 
Spending pc 240 1488.13 306.66 876.00 2246.00 
Quality 240 36.42 12.41 13.82 66.70 
GDP pc 200 21962.22 5783.30 11449.00 33558.00 
Share_pop65 240 19.84 2.84 13.31 26.80 
Alignment 240 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Note: This tables provides the number of observations, mean and standard deviation of the main 
variables of the study.  
 
 
